reports budget statistics for the federal crop insurance program and includes reinsurance year statistics for the returns to the approved insurance providers (AIPs), which represent implicit subsidies. Under the terms of the "public-private" partnership, federally crop insurance can only be offered through these select private companies. Several points are relevant. First, in addition to the substantial premium subsidies paid to farmers, the program also provides subsidies to the private AIPs for "administrative and operating" (A&O) expenses. These subsidies have been substantial in recent years-in excess of $2 billion in 2008. These statistics reflect the fact that A&O subsidies were determined in proportion to total premium, thereby moving in concert with to applicants submitting insurance concept proposals. Though the precise number and cost of such proposals is elusive due to the confidential nature of the process, this legislative action has provided an incentive for developers to conceive programs for even the most minor crops. 4 Such crops are certainly important to the farmers that produce them but one must question the costs of developing, reviewing, and administering such plans of insurance when the total value of the crop may be quite low. A review of the online summary of business statistics for 2011 revealed that programs for 15 crops had less than $1 million in total liability and programs for 14 crops had less than $100,000 in total premium. Likewise, programs for 31 crops had less than $10 million in total liability and programs for 35 crops had less than $1 million in total premium.
Operating costs associated with the federal program are also presented in Table 2 . These costs (included in the "other costs" category) include the costs of reviewing new proposals and have exceeded $100 million in every year since 2002. In short, the legislation has established strong incentives for private industry to generate rents at taxpayer expense for the development and administration of crop insurance plans that only apply to a very minor segment of the agricultural economy.
Deliberations over the 2012 Farm Bill and the 2013 federal budget have included proposals for very modest cuts to crop insurance. The Administration's 2013 budget proposed cuts that would reduce the AIP's return on investment by about 2% and cap A&O subsidies at $0.9 billion.
In addition, a modest reduction of 2 percentage points in the premium subsidy was proposed.
More substantial cuts were proposed by the republican-majority Congress. The reaction from the farm lobby was perhaps best reflected in a statement by National Farmers Union President Roger
Johnson that "once again, we see that Congress is attempting to balance the budget on the backs of rural America." 5 In spite of such proposals for minor reductions in the cost of subsidized crop insurance, no real progress in reducing the budgetary costs of such programs seems likely. In all, proposals for an expanded safety-net in the form of "shallow-loss" programs that would essentially reduce the existing deductible on crop insurance seem the most likely outcome of current policy discussions. Table 3 presents the projected costs of the suite of programs currently comprising the 2008 Farm Bill. The statistics demonstrate an important point-among the commodity programs that comprise the "safety-net" of US agricultural policy, crop insurance has assumed an increasingly costly role and under current conditions will continue to be the most costly farm program. Annual budgetary outlays are projected to exceed $8 billion each year and to total nearly $90 billion over the next decade. 
4
What Market Failure?
Proponents of subsidized crop insurance argue that government provision of such insurance is necessary because the private market has failed to provide such coverage. The perceived failure of market mechanisms is often ascribed to the significant catastrophic exposure that the systemic risks of agriculture represent to private insurers and reinsurers. The argument is that private markets are unable to handle the potential losses associated with a program that had nearly $115 billion in liability in 2011. Two facts tend to bring such assertions into question. The first fundamental fact is that international financial markets for risk sharing are both deep and wide and offer many instruments for reinsuring such risks. Recent estimates assess the size of the international credit default swap market-one form of risk sharing-at over $32 trillion (Brown 2012) . The magnitude of such risk transfer potential would certainly seem to raise questions about arguments that adequate reinsurance for agricultural risks is unavailable. A second fact can be gleaned from the historical experience reported in Table 2 . Two benchmark years characterize the downside risk potential of agricultural insurance-the drought year of 1988 and the floods of 1993. In these two cases, the loss-cost ratio, which represents the proportion of exposure that actually resulted in indemnities, was 15.3% and 14.6%. Thus, even at today's high levels of liability, total indemnities for similar conditions would only amount to less than $17 billion. The total is substantial but is still small relative to the private sector's capacity for reinsuring such systemic risks.
A guiding principle for the federal crop insurance program-in theory at least-is that the highly subsidized plans should not duplicate or displace private insurance market offerings. Of course, a classic "chicken and the egg" conundrum applies here-is the government involved because private markets have failed or has the provision of such significant subsidies displaced any incentives for private insurance? Although this principle is often appealed to as insurance plans are conceived and implemented, ample evidence exists that subsidized insurance does indeed displace and duplicate coverage already provided by the private market. The most prominent example is revenue coverage, which is now the dominant form of federal crop insurance. Commodity options markets that provide private insurance contracts on agricultural commodity prices have been in existence for over twenty
years. An argument of convenience is that such contracts do not precisely match the insurance needs of individual farmers. However, such an argument presupposes the lack of any private intermediary 5 that could tailor price protection to individual producers' needs by using private market options.
Language in a recent Senate Farm Bill proposal implied that subsidies would be provided for private weather insurance plans that are not currently subsidized and reinsured by the RMA. 6 The likelihood that this provision will be enacted is unclear at present but it does at least signal that Congress is aware of the potential displacement of private insurance plans by subsidized insurance.
A large literature has examined farmer demand for crop insurance around the world. Smith and Goodwin (1996) and Smith and Goodwin (2010) survey much of this literature and conclude that most empirical evidence suggests that farmers' willingness to pay for multiple peril crop insurance often does not exceed the costs associated with operating an actuarially sound commercial program. This is not prima facie evidence of a market failure but rather reflects a situation where supply and demand for insurance do not intersect at a price that would allow for a viable commercial market to exist. Abundant evidence of this is reflected in the fact that significant premium subsidies are almost always required to induce significant participation in crop insurance programs. As Smith and Goodwin (2010) note, many factors may explain this fact and it is in no way indicative of a lack of risk aversion by farmers. Rather, it is consistent with a situation in which farmers have alternative risk management mechanisms, including a number of other legislative safety nets, diversification, self-insurance, and off-farm employment. Goodwin and Vado (2007) 
The Harm of Subsidies
Given the absence of market failures, the harm of subsidies and other forms of government intervention is in the distortions that the policies bring about. In the case of subsidized crop insurance, the answer is clear-subsidizing risk leads agents to assume more risk. This may take the form of changes in production patterns (i.e., the quantity and allocation of acreage to individual crops) and changes in production practices (i.e., moral hazard). Smith and Goodwin (1996) , for example, presented evidence that Kansas wheat growers who purchased crop insurance tended to use less fertilizer and chemicals than those that did not insure. Production distortions may occur at several margins as a result of subsidized insurance. At the intensive margin, producers may elect to produce the same crop on the same acreage but alter their production practices in ways that alter risk. The fact that positive returns exist for crop insurance coverage for most crops and locations would be expected to enhance this effect. At the extensive margin, producers may elect to grow riskier crops and bring additional riskier land into production. Using data from the 1980s and 1990s, Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) found that higher crop insurance subsidies did induce statistically significant increases in acreage though the effects were quite modest.
The geographic distributions of participation and relative returns to insurance are presented in figure 1. To the extent that the benefits of subsidized crop insurance are heterogenous across regions and crops, distortions in production patterns may result. The figures show that participation and returns to insurance vary substantially. Participation (in terms of total liability) is particularly high in the Corn Belt, the Mississippi Delta, and in the Upper Great Plains. At the same time, the relative returns to insurance as represented by the ratio of indemnities to subsidy-adjusted premiums, are lower in the Corn Belt but appear to be particularly high in Western Texas, the midsouth, and in certain portions of the Northern Plains. This suggests the potential for production distortions as certain crops and growing areas receive significantly higher subsidies. 7
To examine these potential distortionary effects, we estimate a simple, reduced-form model of acreage response to changes in the crop insurance program using county-level experience data and USDA NASS statistics on planted acreage. Planting-time quotes for harvest-time futures contracts are used to represent expected prices and were deflated using the BLS index of prices paid for inputs by farmers. Five-year historical averages of the subsidy rates (the ratio of subsidies to total premiums) and subsidy-adjusted loss ratios were included as regressors. In addition, the preceding year's level of participation (liability per planted acre) and planted acreage are included to reflect insurance impacts on acreage and partial adjustment. OLS estimates for corn, soybeans, cotton, and wheat are presented in table 4. The results indicate that higher subsidy rates and higher participation (in the previous year) are associated with statistically significant increases in acreage once controlling for the preceding year's planted acreage. In contrast, after controlling for subsidies, a higher return to insurance does not appear to correspond to increases in planted acreage in subsequent years. These results suggest that the very substantial crop insurance subsidies and high participation may indeed be associated with important acreage distortions for these major 
Concluding Remarks
The harm associated with subsidized crop insurance arises from the distortions brought about by what amounts to significant budgetary transfers from taxpayers to farmers and private crop insurance companies. On a fundamental level, the burdens associated with collecting the tax revenues necessary to fund such a program will generate a wide range of distortions in the aggregate economy. More obvious are the potential distortions that may result from the significant subsidies that are provided to farmers and insurance companies. Although proponents of the programs 8 often claim that they are necessary because of a failure of the private market to provide efficient risk management mechanisms, no convincing evidence that such market failures exist is apparent.
International financial markets have a range of mechanisms for risk sharing and the magnitude of systemic risk associated with agriculture in the US is dwarfed by other risks that are traded in financial markets.
Perhaps of greatest concern is the fact that the costs of the US federal crop insurance program has risen to the point that it is the most costly form of intervention in agricultural markets, at least outside of food and nutritional assistance programs. Recent legislation has provided incentives for further expansions of crop insurance programs, with development and administration costs being borne by the taxpayer. Finally, recent proposals for the 2012 Farm Bill have included various versions of "shallow loss" programs that would raise coverage levels and exacerbate the distortions associated with subsidizing risk management. Proponents of such programs would, in the end, hope to see revenue guarantees approaching 90% of expected revenues, making farming unique in terms of taxpayer guarantees of income. In fact, removing all risk from an economic activity is a serious long run concern, effectively mitigating any incentives for innovation and raising concomitant adverse implications for productivity growth and the sector's long run global competitiveness. Such public policies are unlikely to enhance welfare in the long run. 
